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Combatendo a sonegação fiscal mediante 
uma progressividade efetiva
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Abstract: The objective of this article is to discuss the 
issue of tax evasion in the light of real progressivity, 
which is pointed out as an alternative solution to 
the problem. Inserted in this theme, the tax morale 
variable is introduced as a fundamental element to 
tax compliance. Therefore, it’s analyzed the effects 
of a taxation progressivity on tax morale and on tax 
evasion. The paper updates, modifies, and extends 
the research by Doerrenberg and Peicchl (2013). Using 
data from Latin American countries in 2016, it’s obser-
ved that when real progressivity in personal income 
1 Professor dos cursos de Mestrado e de Graduação em Direito da Faculdade 
Damas da Instrução Cristã (ARIC), em Recife (PE). Possui Doutorado em 
Ciência Política pela Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), mestrado 
em Direito pela UFPE, Especialização em Economia pela UFPE e graduação 
em Economia e Direito pela UFPE. E-mail: afccbgp@hotmail.com
2  Professor adjunto de direito financeiro e tributário da Faculdade de Direito 
do Recife. Doutorado em Direito Tributário pela Universidade de Salamanca/
Espanha e Mestrado no International Tax Center da Universidade de Leiden/
Holanda. E-mail: andredantas1@yahoo.com.br
How to figHt tax evasion: real progressivity
revista Brasileira de estudos políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 118 | pp. 13-51 | jan./jun. 2019
14
taxation is not present, it causes low tax morale, low 
tax compliance and thus, more tax evasion.
Keywords: tax evasion; tax morale; progressivity; 
Latin America
Resumo: o objetivo deste trabalho é o de discutir a 
sonegação fiscal sob o escopo de uma efetiva pro-
gressividade tributária, muitas vezes apontada como 
uma alternativa para solucionar a questão. Nesse 
sentido, a moralidade tributária é introduzida como 
um elemento importante na determinação do cumpri-
mento voluntário das normas tributárias.  Busca-se, 
assim, verificar os efeitos da tributação progressiva na 
moralidade tributária e na sonegação fiscal. O artigo 
atualiza, modifica e amplia a pesquisa realizada por 
Doerrenberg e Peicchl (2013). Utilizando dados da 
América Latina de 2016, constata-se que a ausência de 
uma efetiva progressividade na tributação da renda 
é capaz de proporcionar uma queda na moralidade 
tributária e no cumprimento voluntário das normas 
tributárias, o que leva a uma maior sonegação fiscal.
Palavras-chave: sonegação fiscal; moralidade tribu-
tária; progressividade; América Latina
Introduction
In its 2017 Fiscal Panorama for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) emphasized that fiscal evasion 
remains a topic of great regional concern. The second chapter 
of the document, in brief, discusses recent developments of 
income tax, tax reforms and measures to face tax fraud in 
Latin America; and, in particular, it points out that statisti-
cal studies that systematically and periodically quantify tax 
evasion remain a gap to be filled in most countries.
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The ECLAC report analyzed in depth the problem of 
tax evasion, noting that just few countries of that region have 
operational tools to conduct studies seeking estimations of 
tax avoidance and tax evasion in a systematic and periodic 
manner. In addition, when carried out, they are only appli-
cable to VAT. With respect to noncompliance of other taxes, 
as a rule and unfortunately, no study is carried out for control 
and for statistical analysis, except for the income tax but, 
nevertheless, they correspond to old statistical calculations3.
ECLAC reveals that, with respect to income tax, al-
though they correspond to more distant periods, estimations 
on the evasion of this tax are significantly higher, reaching 
the average level of 47.5%.  It is also pointed out that tax 
evasion rates on corporate income tax are usually higher 
than those for individuals (an average of 48.9% and 44.3%, 
respectively) 4. 
Finally, the report also claims that, on average, tax 
fraud amounts to 2.4 percentage points of GDP in the case 
of VAT and 4.3 percentage points in the case of income tax5.
In an international dimension, tax evasion has gained 
a prominent position in recent years, especially among de-
veloped OECD countries and G20 participants, which, in 
2012, requested a detailed and in-depth study by the OECD 
Committee of Fiscal Affairs on solutions to the problem of the 
erosion of the tax base and the transfer of income / profits 
(Project Base Erosion and Profit Shifting - BEPS / OECD).
It should also be noted that these estimations are based 
on national accounts data, thus not taking into account losses 
arising from aggressive tax planning practices or transfer 
pricing that artificially reduce the level of production regis-
tered in an economy.
3 ECLAC, 2017, p. 43.
4 ECLAC, 2017, p. 44
5 ECLAC, 2017, p. 45.
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The debate around these issues has been gaining more 
and more prominence among the governments of the re-
gion, which has provided the adoption of a set of concrete 
decisions and measures in favor of the strengthening of the 
tax administrations. In this sense, this work, when trying 
to investigate what is behind tax evasion, can prove to be 
extremely important in the indication of public policies for 
the region. All these countries face the challenge of secur-
ing sustainable resources for social development. The fight 
against evasion and tax avoidance is undoubtedly a path 
that points in this direction.
In this scope, this article aims to verify the link that can 
be established between tax compliance, tax morale and tax 
evasion, in a tax progressivity scene; and the investigation 
is geographically delimited to Latin America6.
The paper is organised as follows. Chapter 1 provides 
a theoretical review of the main concepts inherent to the 
theme, based on authors and articles of recognized reference 
to the subject in question. Chapter 2 presents an economet-
ric model and informs the variables chosen to analyze the 
correlations that can be established between tax evasion, 
tax progressivity and tax morale. Chapter 3 presents the 
analysis of the econometric results; and, the final chapter, 
the concluding remarks.
1 A theoretical incursion
The work of Allingham and Sandmo, Income Tax 
Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis7, can be taken as a historic 
landmark and theoretical referential in relation to the study 
6 On the relationship between equity in the tax system and tax morale see 
TOGLER, 2003 and RODRIGUEZ,  2017. 
7 ALLINGHAM; SANDMO, 1972.
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of tax evasion. These researchers proposed a model of 
analysis to study the connection between taxation and the 
risk of tax noncompliance, considering the effect of taxes on 
the portfolio of the citizen-taxpayer decision. In the study of 
the subject, the authors chose as the relevant variable of the 
research the problem of tax evasion. The specific objective of 
the article was to evaluate the individual taxpayer’s decision 
on whether, and to what extent, taxpayers under-declared 
their income to avoid paying taxes.8
Technically, the standard model of tax evasion con-
ceived in the work of Allingham and Sandmo, briefly, 
presents the idea that risk-averse taxpayers maximize the 
expected usefulness of income by choosing the amount of 
this that they must conceal. In this approach, the volume of 
unreported taxpayer income will be related to levels of risk 
aversion and real income, marginal tax rates, to the prob-
ability of detection, and to the quantum of fines that can be 
imposed on the taxpayer practicing evasion when caught. 
However, it should be mentioned that this model has over 
time received overwhelming criticism, the most relevant 
is that it confronts the empirical and experimental results, 
determining as a conclusion that there should be more tax 
evasion than that detected in the projections of the model.9
It is observed that literature on tax evasion has gone 
through two very clear lines of research10. The first high-
lights the subjective nature of the probability of detection. 
Many experimental research has been completed following 
this line of argument, whose assumption is that individual 
perceptions of being discovered by tax administration may 
be much greater than the objective probabilities of detection. 
8 See DELL’ANNO, 2009, p. 988.
9 DELL’ANNO, 2009, p. 988.
10 See FELD; FREY, 2007.
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The second considers the topic tax morale as the fundamen-
tal element to explain the greater degree of tax compliance 
in relation to the predictions exposed by Allingham and 
Sandmo11.
Historically, scientific research has pointed out that 
tax morale is greater if the relationship between the tax 
paid and the delivery of public goods and services to the 
collectivity by the rulers are equitable12; in the same direc-
tion, the trust deposited by citizens in government and in 
direct democracy correlates with greater tax morale13. In the 
same direction, the theme of equity or fiscal justice presents 
itself as a relevant topic within the scope of the discussion 
of tax morale. Murphy and Nagel14 define equity (or fiscal 
equity) as the standard to assess differences in tax treatment 
of different individuals15. Fiscal equity, following Wenzel’s16 
categorization, is theoretically subdivided into three types: 
a) perceived equity of results; b) the equity of procedures 
and treatment; c) the equity of penalties imposed. The first 
classification can be measured by the effectiveness of the 
behavior of those who decide to control certain economic 
and institutional variables; the latter two can be measured 
by the size of the informal economy as part of official GDP.
On equity or fiscal justice, many studies point to the 
existence of a concrete link of justice/injustice in political, fis-
cal institutional relations, or economic systems to the good/
bad conscience of citizens. The literature emphasizes values17, 
11 See TORGLER; SCHNEIDER, 2007.
12 Verify TORGLER, 2003a, p. 137.
13 See TORGLER, 2003b.
14 MURPHY; NAGEL, 2002. 
15 In this sense, verify also FOLLONI, 2014, p. 246.
16 WENZEL, 2005.
17 JÚNIOR; OLIVEIRA; MAGALHÃES, 2015, p. 244.
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attitudes, norms, and compliance for laws that influence the 
decision of the taxpayer about the amount of income they 
do not want to declare. The first question that arises in this 
approach is about the harmonic definition of institutes that 
permeate literature, since experts use different denomina-
tions to express similar notions, for example: fiscal morality, 
fiscal ethics, moral rules, psychic cost, social stigma, social 
norms, cost of reputation, civic duty, etc.18
Feld and Frey19 pacified the issue by adopting a defi-
nition anchored in the term “tax morale”, even considering 
various social aspects and psychological motivations that 
lead citizens to pay taxes. The definition that was consecrated 
and accepted as a standard allowed to organize under a 
single expression a set of characteristics, about what a spe-
cialized literature accepted as the determinants of tax morale.
In the literature on tax moral two currents of thought20 
are highlited. The first considers the willingness of taxpay-
ers to meet tax obligations, as an exogenous determinant of 
economic aspects. Therefore, tax morale would be a variable 
dependent on demographic, religious, historical, cultural and 
educational level of taxpayers. The second line of thought, 
conversely, regards tax morale as endogenous to economic 
factors. In this direction, Feld and Frey21 point out three more 
relevant aspects that contribute to shape tax morale: a) the 
fiscal counterpart, where taxpayers obtain public services 
according to the amount of taxes they pay; b) the political 
environment that makes this counterpart effective; and c) 
the personal relationship between taxpayers and fiscal ad-
ministrators”.
18 On equity, fiscal justice and the variables that influence them see: 
DELL´ANNO, 2009, p. 989.
19 FELD; FREY, 2007.
20 See FELD; TORGLER; DONG, 2008. 
21 FELD; FREY, 2007.
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Torgler and Schneider22 also presented studies explor-
ing in greater depth factors that shape tax morale, which can 
be synthesized in three: moral rules and feelings; equity; and 
the quality of relationship between taxpayers and govern-
ment. This categorization reveals the twofold nature of tax 
morale. On one hand, it is based on the subjective charac-
teristics of taxpayers, that is, on their moral rules: one must 
take into account the psychological aspects of the taxpayers. 
On the other hand, it considers the social norms and the 
perception of equity of the system. Therefore, any analysis 
of citizen-taxpayer behavior trying not to pay taxes should 
consider a broader institutional environment, especially the 
place of residence of taxpayers.
In this context, the academic-scientific literature has 
for some time been studying the correlations that are estab-
lished between tax evasion, progressive taxation and tax 
morale. This last expression, generically, was consecrated as 
being “the intrinsic motivation of the taxpayer to honestly 
pay tributes as contribution to the society”. Of course, this 
spontaneous behavior is broadly understood as positive for 
a country since it contributes to lower the cost of financing 
public spending. However, one of the most relevant aspects 
for the understanding of moral behavior in tax field is pre-
cisely to identify the variables that influence the spontaneous 
conduct of the taxpayers to pay their tax due.
The present work updates, modifies and amplifies the 
research done by Doerrenberg and Peicchl23, as it aims to 
investigate the link between tax compliance, tax morale and 
tax evasion in Latin America. For this purpose, the analysis 
is based on theoretical and on regression models developed 
by these authors.24
22 TORGLER; SCHNEIDER, 2007.
23 DOERRENBERG; PEICCHL, 2013.
24 DOERRENBERG; PEICCHL, 2013.
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The models are slightly modified to capture the effects 
of the application of “real” progressivity of taxation on tax 
morale. There is supposed to have a strong between tax 
compliance and tax morale, and as progressive taxation can 
positively affect tax morale, this can help the fight against 
tax evasion.
Tax experts recommend, based on the results of empiri-
cal studies, that: 1) economists need to be interested in the 
determinants of tax morale because tax morale unequivocally 
affects tax compliance behavior and 2) policymakers can act 
against tax evasion through tax morale.25
It is worth mentioning that progressiveness of taxation 
can be fully associated to the idea of  income redistribution, 
depending on the inclination that managers and policy 
makers impose on the management of the state budget. In 
addition, studies show that the impact of progressive taxes 
on individual tax morale depends on individual attitudes, 
which consider income redistribution in general and progres-
sive taxation in particular.
In its turn, economic studies point out that progressive 
taxes increase tax morale of those who are financially bet-
ter placed in the economic-social pyramid but, on the other 
hand, it lowers the tax morale of those who do not benefit 
when there is a linear tax system.
Alesina and Giuliano26 presented a broad review of 
the existing literature and they seem to indicate that income 
is an unsatisfactory variable to explain support for redis-
tribution. In the same direction, the literature on attitudes 
towards progressive taxation contains similar results. In 
Germany, studies by Heinemann and Hennighausen27 show 
25 See HALLA, 2010.
26 See ALESINA; GIULIANO, 2009.
27 HEINEMANN; HENNIGHAUSEN, 2010.
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that personal income concerns are only partially capable of 
explaining support for progressive taxation.
Research results on attitudes towards redistribution 
and progressive taxation may indicate that individuals are 
not only concerned with their own well-being but also with 
those of other people. Thus, there is strong evidence that, 
in addition to the actual payment and fulfillment of the tax 
liability in general, individuals also attach importance to 
equitably fair distributions.
Understanding the determinants of tax morale is a 
relevant factor in explaining why people pay taxes. This 
understanding, simultaneously, can help combat tax evasion. 
In parallel, theoretical studies reveal an extremely important 
link between tax progressivity and tax morale.
The theoretical analysis shows that tax morale of an 
individual is greater, the more progressive is the taxation 
and that the impact of the progressivity scheme, in relation 
to tax morale, declines with the level of income. Therefore, 
the empirical test of these hypotheses reveals a positive (and 
declining) association between progressive taxation and tax 
morale, suggesting that tax evasion is lower in systems with 
high degrees of progressivity.28
On that account, in theory, progressive taxes contrib-
ute to a lower level of tax evasion and to greater equity and 
equality due to the possibility of income redistribution. 
That’s why much of the academic and political debate centers 
on the impact of institutions and policies on tax morale and 
on ways to improve it.
Public policy makers are aware that their citizens have 
different levels of tax morale when establishing the tax bur-
den. It is, therefore, necessary to determine how tax morale 
relates to tax burden that governments impose on different 
28 DOERREMBERG; DUNCAN; FUEST; PEICHL, 2012.
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groups of taxpayers. That is, taking the level of tax morale 
as given, the question is how it affects the tax burden that 
governments impose on different groups of taxpayers.
Many are the independent variables that, in an econo-
metric model, should be considered as determinants of tax 
morale and tax evasion in an environment of tax progres-
sivity. For that reason, it is carried out a theoretical review 
of these variables, based on specialized academic literature.
1.1 Variables tested in the model
a) Age
The literature, when analyzing the age factor, concludes 
that elderly people fulfill their tax obligations better among 
the others29. On this variable, it is also intuited that there 
will be, on older people, less fiscal effects of disincentives, 
in relation to property taxes, than on the younger ones, since 
in the transfer of property this obligation would fall on their 
heirs. In addition, older people are concerned about the pos-
sibility of receiving fiscal sanctions, not only in relation to 
the objective aspects of the fine and tax penalty, but also in 
terms of social acceptance, considering their image before the 
community in which they lived and they built their reputa-
tion and social status.30
b) Sex
The literature points out that women tend to fill their 
income tax returns more accurately than men, thus deter-
mining a lower level of tax evasion when compared to those. 
29 See ALM; TORGLER, 2006; FREY; TORGLER, 2007 and TORGLER; 
SCHAFFNER, 2007.
30 See POMMEREHNE, WECK-HANNEMANN, 1996. 
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However, studies indicate that the coefficient is not signifi-
cant and the marginal effects are very small.31
c) Education
The analysis of the education factor is interesting. 
Especially when it comes to higher education, since it has a 
positive influence on tax evasion. Studies show that an in-
crease in educational level per capita increases the proportion 
of people who have made exaggerated deductions on their 
income tax returns32. The literature argues that taxpayers 
with a better level of formal education may have greater 
knowledge and understanding of tax legislation, and conse-
quently about the possibility or not of committing excesses 
in their deductions or expenses33.
Consequently, a good educational level makes it easier 
to understand the taxation theme and helps to visualize and 
understand the connection between taxes and benefits. A 
better educated taxpayers will naturally be more prepared 
to assimilate tax law and, therefore, better to evaluate the 
degree of risk of tax noncompliance.34
d) Social class 
The social class factor is a variable that is linked to an 
economic aspect (level of income of the taxpayer)35, how-
ever, its analysis gains a high degree of complexity, since, in 
parallel with the mentioned aspect, that are others directly 
linked to the first, for example, the educational level. Em-
31 See DOERRENBERG, PEICHL, 2011 and TORGLER; SCHAFFNER, 2007.
32 TORGLER, 2003a.
33 TORGLER; SCHAFFNER, 2007 and RODRIGUEZ-JUSTICIA; THEILENB, 
2016. 
34 TORGLER, 2003c. 
35 DOERRENBERG, PEICHL, 2011.
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pirical research shows a tendency that low-income groups 
have higher tax morale than groups with better economic 
conditions36.
e) Religiosity
Empirical research that considers the variable religios-
ity as a factor influencing the behavior of taxpayers reveals 
that tax evasion and religious belief are negatively related 
variables. Torgler37 states in his research that there is a strong 
cause-and-effect relationship between religiosity and tax 
evasion, with tax morale as a moderating factor. The results 
are confirmed by Torgler38 for Latin America.
f) Ideology
Ideology is a term that can be analyzed under two 
conceptions: the neutral and the critical. In the first sense 
it means a set of ideas, thoughts, doctrines or world views 
of an individual or a group, that drive  their social actions 
and, mainly, their political ones. In the second conception, 
ideology can be considered as an instrument of domination 
that acts by convincing and alienating human consciousness 
and masking reality.
In the tax field, the ideology factor is very much linked 
to the identification of the political regime established in the 
state (democratic, authoritarian, autocratic) and in the con-
ception of governmental management and how the public 
policies are implemented.
However, in modern times, it is worth considering that 
inserted in the ideology theme, the “right versus left” debate 
has gained a new physiognomy. Nowadays, this distinction 
36 TORGLER, 2003c.
37 TORGLER, 2006.
38 TORGLER, 2006.
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is no longer anchored in the concepts of freedom or the pro-
motion of well-being as a function of economic development; 
but in aspects related to values  such as order, justice and 
protection of the environment. In this understanding, right-
-wing political forces, notably in a capitalist and democratic 
country, struggle especially to ensure order as a priority. 
Left-wing political groups, on the other hand, choose the 
promotion of justice as their primary objective, even though 
this may jeopardize order; and in this direction simultaneou-
sly give the State a role as an active agent in reducing social 
inequality and in promoting the ideals of justice.
According to the doctrine of Bobbio, equality should be 
considered as the central theme of the Left and should not be 
seen as a utopia where all are equal in everything in society, 
but as a dual tendency, in which: on the one hand, it empha-
sizes more aspects which makes men equal, than those who 
make them unequal; and, on the other hand, the search for 
policies that tends to drop inequality, that is, policies aim in 
practice to make more equal the inequals. Moreover, this last 
conception of the left reinforces the idea that the search for 
equality goes hand in hand with the ideals of social justice.
In practice, it is observed that the process of recent 
democratization in Latin America has shown signs of favo-
ring the redistribution of income through the redirection of 
public spending, promoting a social recovery precisely of 
low-income sectors.
As a consequence, it would be natural to understand 
that states governed by political sectors with leftist ideolo-
gies, which direct public expenditure to social recovery, en-
courage the citizen-taxpayer to be more obedient. Converse-
ly, governments with right-wing ideologies, concerned only 
with maintaining order, negatively influence tax compliance.
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g) Level of autocracy
The position of the formulators of both proposals 
and political decisions also has a direct influence on the 
willingness of taxpayers to comply with their tax obliga-
tions. Notably, the theory that views taxes as the object of a 
psychological contract, argues that when the elaboration of 
tax laws is considered fair and the litigation is decided on 
the basis of constitutional precepts, taxpayers generally feel 
more inclined to consider public policies as a counterpart; 
and, as a consequence, they are inclined more spontaneously 
to comply with the tax obligation39.
From the foregoing, it is easy to perceive the difficulty 
of taxpayers complying with the tax obligation in autocratic 
regimes, which do not consider the democratic participation 
of the population in the processes of public policy formula-
tion.
Political participation is a component that has ben-
eficial effects. Strengthening democracy gives citizens the 
opportunity to express their preferences. A more active role 
of taxpayers competes to monitor and to better control the 
politicians and thus it reduces the asymmetry of information 
between them and their agents (government), which reduces 
discretionary power. This situation has an influence on tax 
morale. A stronger pro-democracy political environment 
presents a significant positive result on tax morale40.
h) People’s trust in each other
Some researches indicate that, usually, in societies 
where people have confidence in each other, it is because 
they maintain a closer level of interaction, which can be 
39 FONG, 2001.
40 TORGLER, 2005.
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decisive for a positive attitude concerning paying taxes41. 
The literature indicates that this factor is related to the level 
of social capital. A high level of social capital is an induc-
tive instrument and facilitator to determine a better level of 
government and public management42.
i) Confidence in congress and judiciary
The theme of tax morale establishes a direct relation 
with the confidence that the citizen places in the spheres 
of state power. Therefore, the literature indicates that the 
greater the degree of credibility citizens have in state institu-
tions, the greater the degree of tax morale and, in the same 
direction, that of tax compliance, as well.43
In Latin America, however, it is worth noting that, 
in many countries, the trust that the citizen places, both 
in the Legislative and in the Judiciary, is a cause for con-
cern; because countries characterized by authoritarian or 
undemocratic regimes and that normally do not develop 
public management in a transparent way make it difficult to 
stimulate the moral behavior of citizens in tax field. Besides, 
the lack of confidence in these Sate powers is an instrument 
that acts negatively in relation to tax morale and, in the same 
direction, to tax compliance, which means that it serves to 
stimulate the level of tax evasion.
Additionally, in many countries in Latin America both 
political offices are filled by an economic elite and members 
of the Judiciary usually belong to the more affluent sections 
of society. Thus, politicians and members of the Judiciary 
reproduce the ideology of the ruling elite and perpetuate a 
41 TORGLER; SCHAFFNER, 2007 and DOERREMBERG; DUNCAN; FUEST; 
PEICHL, 2012.
42 FONG, 2001 and HEINEMANN; HENNIGHAUSEN, 2010.  
43 TORGLER 2003a and TORGLER; SCHAFFNER, 2007. 
André Felipe CAnuto Coelho e José André WAnderley dAntAs de oliveirA 29
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 118 | pp. 13-51 | jan./jun. 2019
model that does not serve the community fairly and equita-
bly. Thus, unfortunately, the lower the trust in powers, the 
lower the degree of tax morale and fiscal compliance.
The coherence of the activities performed by the mem-
bers of the Judiciary, reflected in the speed and quality of 
the judicial service affects positively the taxpayers to comply 
with their tax obligations. Hence, a judiciary recognized as 
effective and fair represents an instrument that contributes 
positively to tax morale and consequently to tax compliance.
j) Employment status
Studies show that there is no relevant difference be-
tween categories of employees, but except for a higher level 
of tax evasion among part time employees, the unemployed 
and the retired, when compared to employees working in 
full-time.44
On the other hand, surveys considering macroeco-
nomic indicators reveal that, in periods of economic crisis, 
determinants of unemployment increase in the short term, 
have a negative and significant impact on the tax morale, 
indicating that it reduces in times of crisis.
k) Perception of Corruption
The corruption factor affects in many ways and very 
negatively the tax morale of the taxpayers, determining a 
real frustration on taxpayers. Some papers indicate that in 
Latin America taxpayers do evade taxes because there is cor-
ruption45. Ecuador, Mexico and El Salvador have the highest 
rates, Argentina, Chile and Peru, the lowest.
Corruption can reach a great number of social actors 
involved in taxation. Moreover, when this is manifested in 
44 DOERRENBERG; PEICHL, 2011.
45 TORGLER, 2003a and TORGLER; SCHAFFNER, 2007.
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the sphere of the tax administration, it decisively represents 
a real negative effect on the behavior of taxpayers46.
The literature of fiscal compliance indicates that in 
public management, the discretionary power over resource 
allocation may induce reprehensible corruption behavior. 
This is especially true in developing countries, where pub-
lic agents are in the context of a political elite, who holds 
relevant positions in the hierarchy of public administration 
as well as in legislative houses. Over-regulation, on the one 
hand, and the lack of transparent and democratic procedures, 
on the other, often provides good scope for illicit activities.
In this plan, corruption reduces the efficiency of the 
allocation of public resources, mostly financed through tax 
revenue. In some countries, the wages of tax agents have 
been increased to reduce the incentive for them to engage 
in corruption.
The issue of corruption manifests itself in the most 
varied social strata, even if for different reasons, but in all 
situations represents a component that negatively influences 
tax morale and tax compliance.
2 An empirical assessment
2.1 The model
This article seeks to evaluate the propensity of a Latin 
American to evade paying taxes using the latest data avail-
able from Latinobarómetro, 2016. In this round, 20.204 people 
were interviewed in Latin America. This survey, designed to 
represent a sample of the voting age population, embraces 
a great quantity of topics, from issues related to satisfaction 
46 TORGLER, 2003a and RODRIGUEZ, 2015.
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with the social situation of respondents to various interests 
in politics, conventional or not.
It is crucial to point out that in cross-section47 studies the 
modeling for more than two possible scores (polytomous re-
sponses) is adjusted in a multinomial logistic regression, also 
known as generalized logistic model, in case the categorical 
responses are nominal ones48. Among them, the cumulative 
logit model49 is the most used. Known as a proportional odds 
model50, it assumes that there is approximately linear growth 
of odds ratios for the regression coefficients. The odds ratio 
is a statistic that measures the chances of a particular result 
happens if a particular factor is present. This is a measure that 
tells us how much more likely a person exposed to a certain 
factor under study presents a certain behavior compared to 
another person that is not exposed. It is used to compare the 
probabilities of occurrence of some outcomes (evade taxa-
tion, for example), considering the different perceptions of 
the structures of political opportunities or different socio-
economic conditions.
47 Cross-sectional studies make comparisons at a single point in time, whereas 
longitudinal studies make comparisons over time.
48 A nominal variable is one that has two or more categories, but there is no 
intrinsic ordering to the categories.  For example, gender is a categorical 
variable having two categories (male and female) and there is no intrinsic 
ordering to the categories.
49  The name cumulative link models is adopted from AGRESTI (2002), but the 
models are also known as ordinal regression models although that term is 
sometimes also used for other regression models for ordinal responses such 
as continuation ratio models.
50 Everything begins with the concept of probability. Assuming that the 
probability of success of any event is 0.8, the probability of failure is 1- 0.8 
= 0.2. The odds ratio are defined as the ratio of the probability of success 
in relation to the likelihood of failure. In our example, the odds ratio are 
0.8 / 0.2 = 4. This means that the chances of success are 4 to 1. When OR=1 
exposure does not affect odds of outcome; if OR>1 exposure associated with 
higher odds of outcome and if OR<1 exposure associated with lower odds 
of outcome. 
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The proportional odds model, however, has been used 
in the literature without a basic and important finding about 
its assumptions. Described initially by McCullagh51, it as-
sumes that the coefficients, for each explanatory variable, 
are the same for all logits. Often, however, this assumption 
may not be verified, which allows non-proportionality for 
a subset of covariates that violate proportionality and non-
proportional odds when proportionality is abandoned.
Therefore, this assumption must be tested before the 
setting for the model. With this objective, the test of score 
proposed by Corrar et al. (2007) is used:
S = U’(θ0)[- θ0)]-1U(θ0),
in which U (θ0) is the scoring function U (θ0) = 𝜕log𝐿 (θ) 
/ 𝜕θ evaluated in θ0, [-F (θ0)] - 1 is the inverse of - F (θ0), the 
matrix of variances and observed covariates of U (θ), also 
evaluated in θ0 and U ‘(θ0) represents the derivative of the 
scoring function. This statistic follows asymptotically a chi-
square distribution52 with p = K (J - 2) degrees of freedom, K 
being the number of explanatory variables and J the number 
of variable responses present in the model. For large samples, 
the hypothesis H0 that the model has proportional odds is 
rejected at a level α of significance and p degrees of freedom 
if S> χ2 (1-α, 𝑝). A non-significant test indicates evidence 
that the model to be adjusted is that of proportional odds.
With regard to the ordinal model of proportional odds, 
the strategy to be pursued is the dichotomization of the 
51 McCULLAGH, 1980.
52 The chi-squared distribution is a squared standard normal random variable, 
so it takes only nonnegative values and tends to be right-skewed. The 
extent of its skewness depends on the degrees of freedom or number of 
observations. The higher the degrees of freedom (more observations), the 
less skewed (more symmetrical) the chi-squared distribution.
André Felipe CAnuto Coelho e José André WAnderley dAntAs de oliveirA 33
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 118 | pp. 13-51 | jan./jun. 2019
categories of the response variable53. Data analysis occurs 
in a manner analogous to a dichotomous variable and it is 
performed by combining two of the response categories at a 
time. That is, an accumulated probability is made such that:
θh i j k 1 = Πh i j k 1 
θhijk2 = Πhijk1 + Πhijk2
It is easy to see that, thus, Πhijk3 = 1 - θ Πhijk2
For each subpopulation, for an ordinal response with 
L> 2 categories, L - 1 cumulative logits are considered, based 
on accumulated probabilities. For three categories of the 
response variable, it shows:
logit1(θh i j k 1) = ln    e logit2(θh i j k 2) = ln 
or logit1(θh i j k 1) = β01 + β’ Xhijk e logit2(θh i j k 2) = β02 + β’L Xhijk
It can be seen that the proportional odds model that 
takes both odds into account simultaneously, for each com-
bination of the explanatory variables of the model is:
logit (θhijkL) = β0L + β’L Xhijk where L indexes the two 
logits.
The parameter β01 represents the intercept of the first 
cumulative logit and the parameter β02 represents the inter-
cept of the second cumulative logit. β
𝐿 ′ is a vector of effects 
parameters for the explanatory variables. Xhijk is a represen-
tative vector of explanatory variables. There are L-1 values 
estimated for the intercepts and only one value for each 
53 Thus, considering a multinomial polymorphic model with three responses 
to be predicted by four variables h, i, j and k, the individual probabilities of 
each response are given by Hosmer; Lemeshow (2002): Π hijk1 = P (Y = 1 ІX 
1 = x h, X 2 = x i, X 3 = x j, X 4 = x k) =; Π hijk2 = P (Y = 2 ІX 1 = xh, X 2 = xi, X 
3 = xj, X 4 = xk) = Π hijk3 = P (Y = 3 ІX 1 = xh, X 2 = xi, X 3 = xj, X 4 = xk).
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explanatory variable of the model, being this value used in 
all logits.
Another alternative for rejecting the proportional odds 
assumption is to adjust the non-proportional odds model. 
While in the proportional odds model it is estimated several 
intercepts and a single parameter for each independent va-
riable, which is admitted as valid in all logits, in this model 
several intercepts are estimated as well as several parameters 
for each predictor variable in a respective logit (HOSMER; 
LEMESHOW, 2002). As for the models for the L-th and M-th 
logits adjusted for the explanatory variables Xh ,Xi , Xj and 
Xk, they would be:
logit(θhijkL) = β0L + β1LXh + β2LXi + β3LXj + β4LXk and
logit(θhijkM) = β0M + β1MXh + β2MXi + β3MXj + β4MXk
Since the explanatory variables are not proportional, a 
model is fitted for the generalized logits and not for the cu-
mulative logits where each generalized logit is formed with 
the probability of each response category on the reference 
response category, chosen according to the researcher’s inter-
est. Thus, in an experiment with two independent variables 
h and i and four categories of response variables, with
Πhi1 = Probability of the response occurring in the first 
category of the variable given the conditions h and i.
Πhi2 = Probability of the response occurring in the sec-
ond category of the variable given the conditions h and i.
Πhi3 = Probability of the response to occur in the third 
category of the variable given the conditions h and i.
Πhi4 = Probability of the response to occur in the fourth 
category of the variable given the conditions h and i.
Three generalized logits will be formed. Note that if 
there are L categories of response variable, L-1 generalized 
logits will be formed.
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Taking the fi rst response variable as a reference, it 
shows
logithi1 = log , logithi2 = log , logithi3 = log
Thus, the model to be adjusted for the generalized 
logits is expressed by:
logithik = 𝛽0𝑘 + 𝛽k’Xhi, where k indexes the 3 logits. 
2.2 Looking for the variables
From the discussions in the introduction, the dependent 
variable, tax morale, is the answer to the question made in the 
Latinobarómetro survey (2016): “On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 
means “not at all justifi able” and 10 means “totally justifi able”, 
how justifi able do you believe it is to evade paying taxes? The 
distribution of this variable could be seen in Figure 1: 
Figure 1: Distribution of tax morale, 1 to 10
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), own elaboration
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The dependent variable is condensed in a three res-
ponse variable, where “0” takes the scale 1, never justifi able 
to evade paying taxes, the scale “1” takes the answer 2 to 
6, meaning that it’s sometimes justifi able to evade and the 
scale “2”, where a high propensity to evade is considered 
(Figure 2). One level of the dependent variable is chosen as 
the reference category. This is typically the most common 
or the most frequent category.
Figure 2: Distribution of tax morale, 0 to 2
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), own elaboration
For the independent variables, the article considers54: 
age, sex (male), education, social class, religiosity, ideology, 
autocracy level, level of people’s trust in one another, confi -
54 Respectively in Latinobrómetro (2016): edad, sexo, S13, S22, S8.A, P17ST, 
P10ST, P12ST, P13ST.D, P13ST.F, S18.A, P10TI
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dence in the Congress, confidence in the judiciary, employ-
ment situation and corruption perception. The assumptions 
are that the explanatory variables are able to increase or 
decrease tax morale. 
2.3 How to measure tax progressivity?
Many methods of measuring tax progression have been 
proposed such as tax elasticity and residual income elasticity. 
These first ones relate only to the tax schedule and do not 
care about the income distribution in which the tax applies. 
Musgrave and Thin (1948) were the first ones to propose 
global measures of tax progression as a kind of inequality 
measures of pre- and post-tax incomes, or weighted devia-
tions between taxation and a revenue-neutral hypothetical 
proportional taxation. 
They presented, though, a great shortcoming: tax 
schedules which have for some income intervals declining 
average tax rates, may be categorized as more progressive 
than tax schedules with increasing average tax rates through-
out. Meanwhile, development of global tax progression 
based on dominance relations of Lorenz curves followed 
the discussions. The Lorenz curves prevailed afterwards 
due to single-crossing conditions55 (Hemming; Keen, 1983), 
or domination of elasticity over the whole income support56 
(Jakobsson, 1976; Kakwani, 1977). Notwithstanding, mea-
sures of global tax progression are restricted as they can 
only compare tax schedules if the same income distribution 
applies to all tax schedules to be compared.
Realistic evaluations of tax progression ask for com-
parisons of different tax schedules associated with different 
55 HEMMING; KEEN, 1983.
56 JAKOBSSON, 1976 and KAKWANI, 1977.
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income distributions. However, tax equity implies the deli-
mitation of a citizen’s tax morale insofar, as the latter percei-
ves that a tax system is fair or unfair, leading to a subjective 
consideration of the question of equity. In this respect, this 
paper uses a proxy for tax progressivity in LA. It is taken 
into account the extent to which income inequality could be 
also considered a result of tax policies. In Latinobaromtro 
(2016) the variable number P21ST (“How fair do you think 
income distribution is in your country”) is thus considered.
It’s observed that fiscal policy can help reduce income 
inequality through various channels. First, progressive direct 
taxes and transfers can reduce disposable income inequality 
(inequality of income after taxes and transfers) so that it is 
less than market income inequality (inequality of income 
before taxes and transfers). Second, it can affect “real” dis-
posable income inequality via consumption taxes. Third, 
through in-kind transfer spending (such as on education 
and health), it can reduce the inequality of “full income” 
(disposable income adjusted for in-kind transfers). In-kind 
transfers such as those for education and health also affect 
market income inequality over time by changing the distri-
bution of human capital, including across generations by 
promoting social mobility. The extent of fiscal redistribution 
will depend on both the magnitude of taxes and transfers 
and their progressivity.
Since the progressiveness of a country’s tax system can 
make a great difference in reducing inequality in the distribu-
tion of final income, the more the income is perceived to be 
concentrated, the unfairest the taxation system is considered. 
This is particularly relevant when one does not have a large 
share of progressive taxes in the total tax burden, as is the 
case in most Latin American countries, making the sense of 
inequity in income distribution more perceived.
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These countries rely more heavily on indirect taxes as a 
source of revenue. Overall, indirect taxes in these countries 
tend to be either slightly progressive or slightly regressive 
and therefore have only a small impact on income inequal-
ity57. The low level of direct transfers also limits the extent 
of fi scal redistribution that can be achieved on the spending 
side of the budget. 
It is evident that the tax system can play an important 
role in reducing income disparities. The decisions to be 
made about taxation - how much is to be raised and by what 
means – affect much more than just fi nding the revenue for 
the provision of public services. In this sense, it is argued 
that increasing inequality is a problem, and that it is not 
inevitable. In that context, a good government depends on, 
among other things, tax settings that are genuinely progres-
sive, and which are seen to be both fair and effi cient. 
The paper, therefore, has the following variables:
Table 1 – Th e model’s variables
57 CHU; DAVOODI; GUPTA, 2000.
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Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), own elaboration
3 Th e results 
Once the explanatory variables of the model were 
selected, the score test was performed with the purpose of 
evaluating the assumption of proportional odds for the mo-
del. Table 1 presents the results for this model. The statistic 
of this test was 432.15 with a p-value <0.0001 and 13 degrees 
of freedom, thus indicating the rejection of the hypothesis of 
proportionality. Thus, alternatives to adjustment are the mo-
dels of partial proportional odds or non-proportional odds.
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Table 2 - Estimations of the proportional odds model
Parameter DF Estimation SD Wald (χ2)   P Value
Intercept 1 1 3,42 0,3184 177,05 <0,0001
Intercept 2 1 0,34 0,2124 2,83 0,0937
X1 1 -1,17 0,20 23,05 <0,021
X2 1 -2,11 0,21 82,42 <0,0054
X3 1 -3,72 0,23 116,04 <0,003
X4 1 -3,43 0,98 197,41 <0,0001
X5 1 1,82 0,78 97,13 <0,002
X6 1 0,07 0,81 51,55 <0,043
X7 1 5,42 1,40 432,7 <0,0034
X8 1 0,42 0,3 65,01 <0,032
X9 1 -0,12 0,02 15,4 <0,005
X10 1 -4,37 1,41 187,3 <0,004
X11 1 -5,21 0,08 215,87 <0,0001
X12 1 0,4 0,05 9,48     <0,003
X13 1 2,13 0,98 56,13     <0,0001
Score Test 11 432,15 <0,0001
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), own elaboration
After the rejection of the proportionality hypothesis, 
the parameters were estimated for the non-proportional 
odds model. In this model several parameters for the inter-
cept were estimated, as well as for the covariates in the two 
logits (k -1, where k = 3 response categories). In the logit 1, 
of equation:
Logit 1 = Inter 01 + (Age11).X1 + (Sex21).X2 + (Educ31).X3 
+ (Econ41).X4 + (Rel51)X5 + (Ideol61)X6 + (Auto71)X7 + (Trust81)
X8 + (Jud91)X9 + (Cong101)X10 + (Emp111)X11 + (Corr121)X12 + 
(Prog131)X13.  There are people with a low tendency to evade 
taxation versus there is not.
In the logit 2, of equation: Logit 2 = Inter 02 + (Age12).X1 
+ (Sex22).X2 + (Educ32).X3 + (Econ42).X4 + (Rel52)X5 + (Ideol62)
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X6 + (Auto72)X7 + (Trust82)X8 + (Jud92)X9 + (Cong102)X10 + 
(Emp112)X11 + (Corr122)X12 + (Prog132)X13 represents: There 
are a number of people highly predisposed to evade taxes 
versus there is not.
All variables were significant (p <0.05)58. Therefore, it 
was necessary to adjust the non-proportional odds model 
under the likelihood ratio test (722.8 <0.001) as well as the 
estimation of coefficients and odds ratios having the response 
variable Y = 0 as reference.
Table 3 – Determinants of Tax Morale
Parameter DF Estimation SD P Value OR
Intercept 1 19112 4,84 2,48 - - 
Age11 19112 0,38 0,64 <0.0001 1,08
Sex21 19112 0,29 0,17 <0,0021 1,34
Educ31 19112 0,02 0,81 <0.0032 1,02
Econ41 19112 -1,33 0,16 <0.32 0,26
Relig51 19112 3,75  0,82 <0,45 42,50
Ideo61 19112  4,72  0,78 <0,33 112,11 
Autoc71 19112 0,25  0,48 <0,0031 0,81 
Trust81 19112  -7,45  0,48 <0,51 0,0006 
Jud91 19112  0,45  0,92 <0,0045 1,56 
Cong10 1 19112  -0,45  1,14 <0,4 0,63 
Emp11 1 19112  0,90  0,5 <0,32 2,45 
Corrup12 1 19112  0,14  1,13 <0,0003 1,15 
Tax13 1 19112  0,19  0,33 <0,0001 1,21 
Intercept 2  19112 3,12 2,31 - -
58 In almost all research, the investigator hopes to reject the null hypothesis, 
because the null hypothesis usually it is not the same as the other. When a 
researcher can reject the null hypothesis (and the conventional criterion for 
the decision to reject is p <.05, but that is totally arbitrary), the researcher 
interprets that rejection the evidence that the variables ARE related to each 
other, and that is what researchers usually hope to show.
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Age12 19112 0,31 0,61 <0.02 1,09
Sex22 19112 0,11 0,19 <0.0001 1,12
Educ32 19112 0,04 0,77 <0,029 0,41
Econ42 19112 0,33 0,13 <0.045 1,39
Relig52 19112 1,75  0,74 <0,09 5,75 
Ideol62 19112  0,07  0,78 <0,03 1,04 
Autoc72 19112 2,78  0,45 <0,47 16,11 
Trust82 19112  -1,45  0,51 <0,11 0,23 
Jud92 19112  -0,10  0,84 <0,037 1,90 
Cong102 19112  -0,48  1,11 <0,4 0,62 
Emp112 19112  0,54  0,6 <0,51 1,71
Corrup122 19112  3,13  1,11 <0,002 1,37
Tax132 19112 0,45  0,35 <0,027 1,56 
Source: Latinobarómetro (2016), own elaboration
Thus, the non-proportional odds model adjusted for 
the two logits is:
Logit1 = 4,84 + 0,38.Age11 +0,29.Sex21 + 0,02.Educ31 - 
1,33.Econ41 +3,75.Relig51 +4,72.Ideo61 + 0,25.Autoc71 
-7,45.Trust81 +0,45.Jud91 -0,45.Cong101 +0,90.Emp111 
+0,14.Corrup121 +0,19.Tax131
Logit2 = 3,12 + 0,31.Age12 + 0,11.Sex22 + 0,04.Educ32 
+0,33.Econ42 +1,75.Relig52 +0,07.Ideo62 + 2,78.Autoc72 
-1,45.Trust82 -0,10.Jud92 -0,48.Cong102 +0,54.Emp112 
+3,13.Corrup122 +0,45.Tax132
3.1 Relevant interpretations 
The results confirm partially the hypotheses about the 
impact of the socioeconomic variables and the motivatio-
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nal ones. In the logistic regression 1 the significant results 
- p-value smaller or equal to 0.05, are: age, sex, education, 
autocracy level, confidence in the judiciary, corruption 
perception and tax progressivity. In the case of the second 
logistic regression, the determinants statistically significant 
are: age, sex, education, social-economic class, confidence 
in the judiciary, ideology, corruption perception, and tax 
progressivity.
Finally, in none of the specifications, the variables 
concerning religiosity, trust in others, confidence in the 
Congress, and employment situation have reasonable effects 
on the results, i.e., they are statistically indistinguishable in 
relation to other variables.
Some of the proxies related to the functioning of the 
institutions have a significant effect on the estimated proba-
bility of tax evasion. This is because, in statistical terms, the 
p-values of the variables autocracy level, confidence in the 
judiciary, corruption perception and tax progressivity have 
proved to be smaller or equal to 0.05. In other words, the 
hypotheses that such factors affects the propensity to eva-
de taxation is true and, therefore, they do not result from a 
random situation. In this sense, logit 1 notes that when Latin 
Americans perceived that they are governed for the good of 
all and not for a powerful group, the enhancement of demo-
cracy could bring down the chances to evade by up to 19%.
To interpret the odds ratio of confidence in the judi-
ciary, it is worth mentioning that the results of the survey 
were tabulated between 1 and 4: 1, for those with strong 
confidence; 2, trust greatly; 3, trust a little, and 4, do not 
trust. In other words, the greater the value, the greater the 
mistrust. Returning to the table 2, it is observed that the more 
mistrust with the judiciary, the more chances of cheating the 
tax administration at 56 and 90%, respectively. Once such 
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skepticism in Latin America is higher than the average of 
the other countries, this variable is an important predictor 
for tax cheating.
What about the chances of tax evasion in accordance 
with corruption perception? Here the statistics indicate also 
that the greater perception, the greater chances of not paying 
all the taxes due. However, the data from Latinobarómetro 
revealed a great increase in this perception comparing 2016 
with the precedent years, as many judicial investigations 
took place in the region and many politicians were arrested 
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In this way, the interaction 
of this variable makes the propensity of individuals to try to 
evade taxation at 15 and 37% respectively.
As for the tax progressivity, measured in our model as 
a way to turn the society less unequal, the findings corrobo-
rate the arguments raised before. In particular, the unfairer 
the income distribution is, or the more progressive the tax 
system is, the more probability to evade taxation. In the first 
equation, this probability is 21% higher and in the second, 
56% more.
The results also indicate that the older the Latin Ameri-
cans, the more propensity to evade and men do much more 
than women. Remarkable is the fact that the more educated 
the Latin American, the greater propensity to evade taxation, 
but very slightly, at 8 and 9% more.
Interestingly, ideology presented a significant effect on 
the propensity of Latin Americans to try to evade taxation 
in the second equation. By the way she was measured in the 
survey, the results indicate that further to the right is the 
citizen, the greater propensity to cheat, but at a very little 
difference of 4%.
It follows from the foregoing that the presented results 
corroborate our expectations that the political context, its 
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structure and its perception are important predictors of tax 
evasion.
Concluding remarks
There is great evidence that observed tax compliance 
behavior cannot be explained entirely with the traditional 
economic analysis that focuses mainly on deterrence com-
ponents. Instead, there are several other factors that help 
explain why many people are compliant, especially the no-
tion of ‘‘tax morale’’. The literature that followed focused on 
the link between tax morale and compliance behavior and 
it reported a positive correlation of the two elements. There 
are some evidence that countries with a high degree of tax 
morale promote high degree of tax compliance and even a 
low informal economy. 
Tax morale, or ‘‘the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes’’, 
might help explain the puzzle of why so many individuals 
pay their taxes. Interestingly, this has been discussed as a 
residual explanation without investigating factors that shape 
tax morale. By analyzing tax morale as a dependent varia-
ble and trying to search for determinants, many interesting 
results are found. In this way, governments might be called 
to carry out several policy changes in order to foster tax 
compliance levels, such as simplifying taxpaying procedure; 
making believe for the taxpayers that paying taxes is the right 
thing to do; developing fairer tax systems and promoting 
cooperative rather than deterrent tax policies.
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